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Prison Disciplinary Procedures and
Judicial Review Under the
Nebraska Administrative
Procedure Act
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 1976 Ronald Reed escaped from the Lincoln Work
Release Center and was subsequently convicted of and sentenced
for the crime of escape.' His escape also served as the basis for a
prison disciplinary proceeding before the Nebraska Penal Com-
plex Adjustment Committee in February 1978.2 As a result of that
hearing Reed lost all his accumulated good time3 and was placed in
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. B.A 1967, Douglass
College; MA. 1971, Seton Hall Univ.; J.D. 1974, Rutgers Univ. School of Law.
1. State v. Reed, 205 Neb. 45, 286 N.W.2d 111 (1979).
2. In virtually all prison systems in the United States criminal offenses commit-
ted by a prisoner while incarcerated are also denominated and may be
treated as major disciplinary infractions. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COM-
IMISSIONERS ON UNIFOmi STATE LAWS, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS
ACT § 4-511, Comment (1979) [hereinafter cited as M.S.C-.A]. If a prisoner's
activity constitutes a crime, as it did in Reed, he may be prosecuted, con-
victed, and sentenced for that criminal offense and in a disciplinary proceed-
ing also lose substantial amounts of good time. Thus, he is penalized twice
for the same violation. I consider this a bad policy result and, at a minimum,
prefer the position taken in the M.S.C. (for which I was project director and
a reporter) that good time lost in the disciplinary proceeding be credited
against the new criminal sentence. M.S.C-. § 4-511. It is also bad policy, and
these situations occur much more frequently (at least when the criminal of-
fense is something other than an escape), for even a serious criminal offense
to be treated merely as a disciplinary infraction and not made the basis of a
criminal trial See id. §§ 4-511 to -512, Comments. Both the prisoner and soci-
ety lose when this happens. At a disciplinary proceeding, even one in which
substantial amounts of good time are lost, the prisoner is neither entitled to
nor afforded the full panoply of constitutional rights, including the proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt burden, of a defendant at a criminal trial. Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). On the other hand, the penalty to which the
prisoner is subject at the hearing is substantially less serious than the poten-
tial criminal sentence could have been.
3. Good time reductions of the sentence imposed are common in most statutory
sentencing schemes. In many jurisdictions, including Nebraska, good time is
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the Nebraska Penal Complex Adjustment Center for six months.
The disciplinary committee action was affirmed by the Nebraska
Penal Complex Appeal Board. Reed then sued in district court for
reversal of the disciplinary committee decision.4 The district court
dismissed Reed's petition, rejecting his argument that district
court jurisdiction was provided by the judicial review sections of
the Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act (APA).5 In Reed v.
Parratt,6 the Nebraska Supreme Court, over a dissent by Chief
Justice Krivosha,7 rejected Reed's claim that the APA provides for
judicial review of a prison disciplinary decision.
In this article I will examine the Reed decision, a decision that I
believe demonstrates flawed legislative interpretation influenced
by ill-advised policy considerations. I will also present alternatives
to rectify the Reed result and thereby provide judicial review of
prison disciplinary decisions.
II. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE PRISON DISCIPLINARY
PROCEDURES STATUTE AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
In 1976 the Nebraska Unicameral adopted specific provisions
governing the procedures to be applied in disciplinary actions in
state facilities administered by the Department of Correctional
Services.8 Among the requirements there set forth is a require-
ment that the department adopt rules and regulations to deter-
mine rights and privileges retained and forfeited by a prisoner.9
Rules are required to govern, among other things:
(a) disciplinary restrictions on clothing, bedding, facilities, mail, and visi-
tations in an institution, (b) solitary confinement, (c) grievance proce-
dures, hearings, and review, (d) good-time credit, (e) criteria for
psychological treatment and sociological development programs,
(f) rehabilitation opportunities, and (g) educational or employment
programs.1 0
automatically credited to the prisoner and may be forfeited only upon the
commission of a disciplinary infraction. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,107
(Reissue 1976). In other jurisdictions the prisoner must earn his good time
credits. See, e.g., M.S.C.A. § 3-501, Comment.
4. Reed v. Parratt, 207 Neb. 796, 301 N.W.2d 343 (1981). Reed sought declaratory
relief, claiming a violation of both his constitutional rights and the rules of
the Department of Correctional Services, and an expungement of matters re-
lating to the disciplinary action.
5. Id. at 797, 301 N.W.2d at 344. The APA judicial review provisions are located
in NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-917 to -919 (Reissue 1976). For a recent article dis-
cussing the APA, see Willborn, A Time For Change: A Critical Analysis of the
Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act, 60 NEB. L REV. 1 (1981).
6. 207 Neb. 796, 301 N.W.2d 343 (1981).
7. Id. at 799, 301 N.W.2d at 345. Judge Brodkey joined in the dissent.
8. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-4,109 to -4,123 (Reissue 1976).
9. Id. § 83-111.
10. Id. § 83-4,111(2).
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The rules adopted specifically are required to be ified pursuant to
procedures set forth in the Nebraska APA.11 The APA procedures
require public hearings on the proposed rules12 and submission of
the proposed rules to the attorney general for consideration as to
their legality and constitutionality.' 3 The Department, which con-
ceded during oral argument in the Reed case the applicability of
the APA rulemaking procedures to the adoption of correctional de-
partment rules,14 did in fact comply with these procedures.
The prison disciplinary procedures statute also governs the
hearing procedures that apply in prison disciplinary actions, in-
cluding an action, such as that instituted against Reed, in which
good time credit may be lost.' 5 These procedures include, gener-
ally, the opportunity for a prisoner to testify at the hearing, to pres-
ent evidence and witnesses, and to question persons called to
testify by the hearing officer. The prisoner also is entitled to a writ-
ten statement of the basis for a decision against him.16 These hear-
ing procedures are fairly comprehensive and, when different from
the APA hearing procedures applicable to state agencies gener-
ally,'7 certainly override the APA procedures. 8
If the issue in Reed v. Parratt, then, were the applicability to a
prison disciplinary hearing of the Nebraska Administrative Proce-
dure Act's hearing requirements, I would agree with the Reed ma-
jority that the specific prison disciplinary procedures statute was
intended by the legislature to, and does, in fact, control over the
11. Id. § 83-4,112.
12. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-907 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
13. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-905.01 (Reissue 1976).
14. 207 Neb. at 800, 301 N.W.2d at 345-46 (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting).
15. NEB. REV. STAT. § 834,122 (Reissue 1976). These procedures also apply if the
potential sanctions involve isolation or a change in program assignment. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. § 84-913. Section 84-913 of the Nebraska APA requires that in a contested
case before an agency all parties be afforded an opportunity for hearing after
reasonable notice as defined in that section. It affords parties a right to pres-
ent evidence and argument. It also requires that an official record be kept of
the hearing and that an agency adopt rules of procedure in contested cases.
Id. The Nebraska APA also requires an agency in a contested case to give
effect to evidence, recognize privileges, administer oaths, and afford both the
right of cross-examination and the right to submit rebuttal evidence. Id.
§ 84-914.
18. Many of the hearing procedures are common to both statutes. Compare NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 83-4,120 to -4,122 (Reissue 1976) with NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-913
to -915 (Reissue 1976). The major differences between the statutes are that
under the APA, but not under the prison disciplinary statute, a party is pro-
vided the absolute right of cross-examination, NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-914(4)
(Reissue 1976), and the right to require agency compliance with the rules of
evidence. Id. § 84-914(1).
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general APA provisions. But the question in Reed did not concern
the procedures applicable to a prison disciplinary hearing; instead,
the Reed court was faced with deciding whether judicial review of
the disciplinary committee decision was available under the APA.
As to this question, there is nothing of comparable specificity in
the prison disciplinary statute to compel a finding that the APA
judicial review provisions, like those governing the hearing proce-
dures, are preempted. In fact, the only language in the prison dis-
ciplinary procedures statute that addresses review merely
provides that "any review of disciplinary action imposed upon any
person shall be pursuant to the provisions of section 83-4,109 to 83-
4,123 [prison disciplinary proceedings]."'19 This language need not,
and indeed, I would say, should not, be interpreted to preclude ju-
dicial review and thus to override applicability of the plain lan-
guage of the APA,20 at least not when there is another, equally
reasonable interpretation possible.
The more appropriate act of statutory interpretation is one that
attempts to harmonize two statutes rather than find them in con-
flict. A harmonizing reading, entirely consistent with the language
of the prison disciplinary procedures statute, would hold that stat-
ute applicable, not to judicial review, but only to the internal
prison review mechanisms that should be exhausted before resort
to the courts. As the Chief Justice wrote:
Those specific sections [sections 83-4,109 to -4,123 (Disciplinary Proce-
dures in Adult Institutions)] simply prescribe the procedures under
which the hearings before the prison boards shall be conducted in the first
instance. That is, in effect, no different than a host of other sections in our
statutes prescribing procedures to be followed by various agencies in the
first instance. The internal review of disciplinary action may very well, in
the first instance, be pursuant to the provisions of §§ 834109 to 834123.
One can very easily harmonize the provisions of §§ 834109 to 83-4,123 and
the provisions of §§ 84-901 to 84-919 [APA], the former applying to hear-
ings before the agency and the latter applying to appeals before the court
from the action of the agency. They are not in any manner inconsistent or
contrary one to the other.
2 1
This interpretation finds support in the final section of the prison
disciplinary procedures statute. This section, "Access to Courts
19. Id. § 83-4,115.
20. For the specific APA language, see text accompanying note 33 infra.
21. 207 Neb. at 801, 301 N.W.2d at 346 (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis ad-
ded). This construction conforms more closely than the majority's to the rule
of statutory construction requiring that statutes in pari materia be construed
together in an effort to uphold both. See, e.g., BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND IN-
TERPRETATON OF LAws § 104 (2d ed. 1911). For an example of a legislature
providing specific and preemptive statutes to govern prison hearing proce-
dures while providing judicial review of the prison decision under its general
APA, see Penn v. Department of Corrections, 100 Mich. App. 532, 538-39, 298
N.W.2d 756, 758-59 (1980).
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and Legal Assistance Unrestricted,"22 mandates a construction of
the prison disciplinary procedures statute that does not "restrict or
impair an inmate's free access to the courts and necessary legal
assistance in any cause of action arising under [the disciplinary
procedures provision] ."23 The import of this section is that the dis-
ciplinary procedures statute is not a legislative attempt to control
prisoner access to the courts over matters raised at prison discipli-
nary hearings. Thus, in common with Chief Justice Krivosha, I
think the specific statutory disciplinary sections governing prison
hearings do not prevent, nor were they intended to prevent, a pris-
oner's access to the courts under the otherwise applicable APA.24
The Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act25 applies to
agency activities. "Agency" is defined as a "board, commission, de-
partment, officer, division, or other administrative office or unit of
the state government authorized by law to make rules." 26 Specifi-
cally exempted from the definition are the Adjutant General's Of-
fice, the courts, and the legislature-but not the Department of
Correctional Services.2 7 Under the APA, a rule is defined, in perti-
nent part, as "any rule, regulation, or standard issued by an
agency,... designed to implement, interpret, or make specific the
law enforced or administered by it ... and for the purpose of this
act every rule which shall prescribe a penalty shall be presumed to
have general applicability or to affect private rights and interest."28
There is no basis for an argument that the consequences to Reed
arising from the prison disciplinary hearing (loss of all accumu-
lated good time and confinement to the Penal Adjustment Center
for six months) do not constitute a penalty affecting private rights
within the statutory definition.29 Thus, it is clear, and nothing con-
22. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-4,123 (Reissue 1976).
23. Id.
24. I do not wish to sound disingenuous here. I realize, of course, that the legisla-
ture may not have considered the relationship between the two statutes.
Even if it did, its statutory resolution most assuredly does not reflect a single,
uniform reason for the votes cast by individual senators. What I do suggest is
that within constitutional limits the legislature is free to provide any statu-
tory scheme it wishes (or to provide a scheme while neither wishing nor try-
ing). The court's function is not to substitute its own judgment of wise policy
but to effectuate the statutory mandate consistent with the legislative in-
tent-so far as the court is able to interpret that intent.
25. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-901 to -919 (Reissue 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1980 & Supp.
1981).
26. Id. § 84-901 (Supp. 1981).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 84-901(2) (Reissue 1976 & Supp. 1981).
29. In addressing the Nebraska statutory language, the majority in Reed made no
real attempt to demonstrate its view of the inapplicability of this definition to
Reed's situation beyond a one-sentence allusion to an APA proceeding as in-
volving "the rights or privileges of members of the general public and... not
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tradictory appears in the Reed opinion, that the Department of
Correctional Services is an agency for purposes of the APA.30 Cer-
tainly, if the legislature intended to exempt the department from
the APA requirements for all or selected purposes, it could have
effected that intent by clear and unequivocal language.3 '
Under the Nebraska APA judicial review of an agency decision
is available. 32 Specifically:
Any person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case, whether
such decision is affirmative or negative in form, is entitled to judicial re-
view under sections 84-917 to 84-919. Nothing in this section shall be
deemed to prevent resort to other means of review, redress, or relief pro-
vided by law. 3 3
It strikes me, therefore, that the plain language of the APA,34 and
particularly the sections on judicial review, make the Act applica-
ble to prison disciplinary hearings. Indeed, nothing in the Reed
majority opinion appears to dispute Reed's claim that he was a
"person aggrieved by a final decision" 35 under the APA. In com-
mon with Chief Justice Krivosha I believe that the plain, clear, and
unambiguous APA language providing judicial review is not over-
ridden by any equivalent plain, clear, and unambiguous language
in the prison disciplinary procedures statute that can be read to
deprive prisoners of judicial review.
I would not be heard to suggest, however, that statutory plain
language, even when spoken in absolute terms, should be con-
strued without regard to legislative policy. Statutory interpreta-
tion requires an understanding and appreciation both of the
context out of which the statute derives and of the purposes
sought to be achieved by the legislature when enacting the stat-
ute.36 Legislative interpretation, therefore, necessarily requires an
evaluation of the legislative policy giving rise to the statutory lan-
guage. For example, a statute may be enacted that makes driving
related to the internal operation of an institution." 207 Neb. at 978, 301 N.W.2d
at 345.
30. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
31. Cf. Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962) (Congressional intent must be shown to
preclude judicial review of administrative decisions); Cofone v. Manson, 594
F.2d 934, 938 (2d Cir. 1979) (Department of Corrections explicitly exempted
from certain requirements of Administrative Procedure Act).
32. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 84-917 to -919 (Reissue 1976).
33. Id. § 84-917(1).
34. Chief Justice Krivosha described the provisions as stating their terms
"clearly and unequivocally." 207 Neb. at 800, 301 N.W.2d at 346 (Krivosha,
C.J., dissenting).
35. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917 (Reissue 1976). The Reed majority did decide, how-
ever, that a prison disciplinary hearing is not a "contested case." For a dis-
cussion of this aspect of the opinion, see text accompanying notes 42-45 infra.
36. See, e.g., 25 RULING CASE LAw, Statutes § 230 (1919); J. SUTHERLAND, STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION § 363 (2d ed. 1904).
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above posted speed limits a misdemeanor and by its language ap-
parently admits of no exceptions in any circumstances. Such a
statute legitimately could be read, and in terms of projected legis-
lative policy undoubtedly should be read, to exclude from the
scope of its coverage a police officer who speeds in pursuit of a
suspect.37 The legislative intent, however unqualified the language
employed, was to deter speeders, not law enforcers enforcing the
law.
Of course, it forcefully could be argued that legislation should
be construed narrowly with plain language read as drafted. Nar-
row construction should encourage a legislature to draft carefully,
to know what it wants to say, and to say it clearly and accurately.
Ideally, the legislature would anticipate types of situations falling
outside the intended scope of a statute and expressly exclude
them. To return to my example, the need for an exception for
course-of-duty police speeding in a misdemeanor speed statute is
one that readily may be anticipated. That being so, the statute eas-
ily could be drafted to include a law enforcement exception. If
such narrow construction were applied to the applicability of the
APA judicial review sections to prison hearings, the Reed court
would have had to find APA judicial review available to prisoners.
The Act, after all, admits of no exceptions.
It nonetheless is appropriate, for many reasons, for a court to
consider underlying policy in interpreting statutory language.
First, not every situation which the legislature would intend to ex-
clude from the scope of a statute may be readily anticipated. Sec-
ond, even if a legislature were gifted with the prescience to
anticipate all such situations and the ability to draft around them,
the legislative process does not afford the time to achieve such a
result in each bill before the legislature. Third, statutes would be-
come much more complex and lengthy, and unless legislatures ac-
quired an ability that has so far eluded the rest of us, an ability to
effect perfection, the interpretative problem still would not disap-
pear.38 Given the time constraints incumbent on legislative activ-
37. This is not to suggest that the best law enforcement policy is one that encour-
ages high speed chases or that the legislature, by not including such conduct
within the scope of the misdemeanor speed legislation, intends to condone or
sanction the conduct. It is merely to suggest that, however blanket the lan-
guage in the legislation with respect to speeding, the best projection as to
legislative intent would be that an on-duty police officer in the-course of his
duties was meant to be excluded from coverage.
38. One example of the difficulty of legislative drafting is represented by the con-
struction problems related to the legislative interpretation rule of ejusdem
generis. See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395,
405 (1950).
1982]
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ity, the political context and the ready give and take in which a
legislature operates, and its inability to achieve drafting perfec-
tion,39 the judiciary must at times act interstitially to assure fulfill-
ment of the legislative policy. As Llewellyn stated:
[The court must]... take the music of any statute as written by the legis-
lature; it must take the text of the play as written by the legislature. But
there are many ways to play that music, to play that play, and a court's
duty is to play it well, and in harmony with the other music of the legal
system.4 o
Thus, although I disagree with the Reed majority with respect
to the plain language of the APA and its relationship to the prison
disciplinary procedures statute, I do believe that, to the extent the
majority found ambiguity in the relationship of the two statutes, 4 1
it appropriately resorted to an evaluation of the underlying legisla-
tive policy. Unfortunately, once the majority considered underly-
ing policy, it incorrectly evaluated that policy and did not play it
"in harmony with the other music of the legal system." An exami-
nation of underlying policy, including the long and firmly held pol-
icy in support of the need for and efficacy of judicial review,
absolutely compels a resolution of any ambiguity in favor of the
applicability of judicial review under the APA.
I. REED MAJORITY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Reed majority decided that the statutory prison discipli-
nary procedures by their import, if not by direct language, make
the APA inapplicable to judicial review of prison hearings. It re-
jected the applicability of the APA judicial review sections to
prison hearings primarily on the theory that a prison disciplinary
hearing is not a "contested case" within the meaning of the APA.
The majority appears to have so concluded because a prisoner at
such a hearing is not entitled to all, or even most, of the rights af-
forded a defendant at a criminal trial.42 This is without doubt true
but, with due deference to the majority, hardly relevant: adminis-
trative hearings are not criminal trials and no one argues that they
are. A petitioner at an administrative hearing is neither entitled to
nor afforded all the rights of a criminal defendant;43 prisoners
39. The art or task of legislative drafting is not a simple one. See, e.g., DIcKER-
SON, THE FUNDAMENTALs OF LEGAL DRAFTING (1965).
40. Llewellyn, supra note 38, at 399.
41. In considering underlying policy and the relationship of the two statutes, the
majority, somewhat anomalously I believe, found judicial review under the
APA inapplicable to prison hearings, yet remanded for a district court deter-
mination whether judicial review would be available under the Nebraska De-
claratory Judgment Act. See notes 114-24 & accompanying text infra.
42. 207 Neb. at 799, 301 N.W.2d at 345.
43. See 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-913 to -914 (Reissue 1976);
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before disciplinary boards are not unique in this respect. As de-
fined in the Nebraska APA, a "contested case" is "a proceeding
before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of
specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be de-
termined after an agency hearing."44 Chief Justice irivosha, in
evaluating whether Reed's was a contested case, found it "clear be-
yond question that the order of the appeal board which found Reed
guilty of escape and ordered that he lose all previously acquired
good time and spend 6 months in the Nebraska Penal Complex Ad-
justment Center is a penalty and does, indeed, affect private
rights."45 Thus, a finding that a "contested case" exists is not de-
pendent on an examination of the degree to which the agency
hearing resembles a criminal trial. A contested case depends, in-
stead, on the nature of the deprivation and, presumably, the adver-
sarial nature of the proceeding.
The majority in Reed, however, while appearing to admit that a
prison disciplinary hearing is adversarial and that private rights
are affected by a disciplinary board decision,4 6 nonetheless ignored
the applicability of the APA.47 The majority cited the United
States Supreme Court decision in Wolffv. McDonnell 48 as demon-
strating that only minimal due process rights are required at
prison disciplinary hearings. 4 9 The United States Supreme Court
in Wolff, however, was describing minimal rights afforded by the
Constitution of the United States, and not what it considered to be
wise legislative policy. In fact, in Wolff itself the Court left to legis-
lative determination the appropriate scope (beyond the constitu-
tional minimum) of due process rights that can be provided at a
disciplinary hearing without risk to security or other legitimate
state interests.5 0 Wolff provides a statement by the United States
Supreme Court that beyond describing constitutional minima a
federal court is an inappropriate5l tribunal to weigh competing in-
Meyers & Rabiej, Burden of Proof and the Standard of Judicial Review in
Prison Disciplinary Hearings Involving Decisions Predicated Upon Uncor-
roborated Hearsay Evidence, 1979 S. I.T_ U.LJ. 535, 540 & n.18.
44. NEr. REv. STAT. § 84-901(3) (Supp. 1981). See Lawrence v. Department of
Corrections, 88 Mich. App. 167, 276 N.W.2d 554, appeal denied, 407 Mich. 909
(1979).
45. 207 Neb. at 801, 301 N.W.2d at 346 (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting). See note 29
supra.
46. For an explanation of why good time forfeiture is a substantial deprivation to
a prisoner, see note 69 infra.
47. 207 Neb. at 799, 301 N.W.2d at 345.
48. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
49. 207 Neb. at 798, 301 N.W.2d at 345.
50. Id.
51. If not incompetent in a constitutional sense. See generally Berger, Paul
Brest's Brieffor an Imperial Judicary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1 (1981).
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terests and to determine wise policy in a state prison setting.52
Properly stated, that is a legislative function. Chief Justice Burger
described this difference in yet another prison case,5 3 one concern-
ing unionization by prisoners:
This is but another in a long line of cases in the federal courts raising
questions concerning the authority of the States to regulate and adminis-
ter matters peculiarly local in nature. Too often there is confusion as to
what the Court decides in this type of case. The issue here, of course, is
not whether prison "unions" are "good" or "bad", but rather, whether the
Federal Constitution prohibits state prison officials from deciding to ex-
clude such organizations of inmates from prison society in their efforts to
carry out one of the most vexing of all state responsibilities--that of oper-
ating a penalogical institution. In determining that it does not, we do not
suggest that prison officials could not or should not permit such inmate
organizations, but only that the Constitution does not require them to do
SO.
• . . The federal courts, as we have often noted, are not equipped by
experience or otherwise to "second-guess" the decisions of state legisla-
tures and administrators in this sensitive area .... 54
Had the task requested of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Reed
been to describe a right of prisoner appeal as a matter of Nebraska
constitutional law, the Nebraska court's refusal to act perhaps
would have been appropriate.5 5 But the Reed case is in a far differ-
ent posture. The Nebraska Supreme Court was not asked to make
its own policy choices in this "most vexing of all state responsibili-
ties" but merely to carry out the judgment made by the legislative
branch. The real question before the Nebraska court was whether,
in the face of a substantial deprivation to a prisoner, the legislature
through the APA afforded that prisoner more than the federal con-
stitutional due process minima.
The Nebraska Supreme Court majority apparently believed
that the Unicameral could not have chosen to make more formal
the prison disciplinary hearing because more formal hearings gen-
erally take more time to complete. The court found that these
hearings, traditionally summary in nature, must be conducted ex-
peditiously if security and safety at the prison are to be assured.56
52. On the difference between what is mandated by the United States Constitu-
tion and what, although perhaps wise policy, is not mandated, see Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963).
53. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
54. Id. at 136-37 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
55. Yet, even here, the Wolff Court's disinclination, indeed, lack of power, as a
federal court to dictate state policy is no bar to a state court deciding to act.
For an example of a state court's willingness to interpret its state constitution
to mandate court intervention in the prison context, see Monks v. New Jersey
State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971).
56. A contra argument may be made with respect to how best to assure prison
safety and security: hearings granting prisoners a greater voice and a better
opportunity to be heard may impart a sense of institutional fairness that will
[Vol. 61:1
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As noted previously,57 however, the prison hearing procedures
themselves are not at issue in Reed. The legislature, perhaps re-
flecting the concern for expedition addressed by the court, did pro-
vide specifically for curtailed prison hearing procedures
alternative to, and arguably providing a quicker result than, those
prescribed in the APA.58 And I have no doubt that the proper re-
sult, at least for purposes of statutory interpretation, is that these
specific prison procedures control over those in the APA governing
agency hearings. The issue in Reed, however, was merely whether
a court may review the final agency decision according to APA re-
quirements for judicial review. In this situation, the opportunity
for judicial review would not affect adversely the nature of the
hearing conducted before the disciplinary board or contribute in
any way to a more unwieldy or "unmanageable" hearing.
On the other hand, judicial review might well contribute to
making these hearings more objectively fair.59 Let us for the mo-
ment accept the court's view of a legislative judgment that prison
hearings must be conducted informally and quickly. There is noth-
ing inconsistent with that policy in a legislative judgment to pro-
vide prison hearing procedures alternative to those of the APA
while yet maintaining judicial review of the final decision reached.
In its decision, however, the Reed court created the anomaly of a
state agency whose rules must be, and were, adopted according to
APA procedures but whose hearings applying those rules are ex-
empt from the judicial review provisions of the APA. The Reed
majority opinion thus appears to leave open the possibility that
rules required to be adopted under APA procedures to assure rea-
sonableness and fairness may be avoided in application at a prison
hearing-with no court review available to require compliance.60
relieve tensions and offset a tendency to rely on illegal and unsanctioned
ways to convey grievances.
57. See text accompanying notes 17-24 supra.
58. The curtailed prison hearing procedures, whether or not they assure shorter
hearings, do decrease the opportunity for what many prison administrators
see as unseemly conflict between the prisoner and the prison administration.
One example of such a "conflict" is a prisoner cross-examining guards and
other employees of the Department of Correctional Services who testify
against him.
59. For a discussion of the effect of judicial review on the conduct of a hearing,
see text accompanying notes 63-65 infra.
60. Reed likely was not injured by an inability to obtain court review of the disci-
plinary hearing decision. The facts underlying the offense for which he was
charged and sanctioned at the prison were also litigated at his criminal trial
There he was found guilty, under a far higher burden of proof than obtained
at the disciplinary hearing and with a full panoply of due process and sixth
amendment rights. That verdict was reviewed and affirmed on appeal. State
v. Reed, 205 Neb. 45, 286 N.W.2d 111 (1979).
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IV. ADVANTAGES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
There is no federal constitutional right to appeal, even from a
conviction in a criminal case.6 ' Yet the federal system chose by
statute to permit appeals in both civil and criminal cases,62 and
every state in the nation, whether by state constitution or statute,
likewise permits appeals from final decisions by courts of original
jurisdiction. Similarly, agency action under the APA is subject to
review by a court. Judicial review of decisions by the initial trier of
fact, whether the trier of fact is a court or an agency, is, and always
has been, a commonplace of the American legal system. Recogni-
tion that court review protects important values in a system of
laws explains its position of prominence.
Institution of an appellate process is not a jurisdiction's decla-
ration that its triers of fact are always or regularly unskilled in the
law, ignorant, biased, or arbitrary or capricious. Nor is a provision
for judicial review an expression of mistrust in the system by the
drafters of constitutions and statutes. Institution of a right of judi-
cial review is a practical recognition that nothing and no one is per-
fect, that occasionally errors are made even in the best of all
possible worlds. Judicial review, then, does not imply a judgment
that the factfinder is always or even frequently in error, but, rather,
judicial review provides a mechanism for correcting those errors
that do occur.
Further, our legal system was created and is designed to protect
the individual against governmental excesses, whether real or po-
tential. Imposition of judicial review thus provides a routinized
process for overseeing the governmental system to prevent such
excesses.
An appellate process of review, conducted by an impartial and
objective court, has an additional and perhaps less obvious benefit.
It cogently can be argued that the mere existence of a review pro-
cess carries with it a better assurance of diligence in the trier of
fact, whether a judge or agency hearing officer, to conduct an objec-
tively fair hearing. The trier of fact, knowing his decision is subject
to scrutiny by a reviewing court, will have additional incentive to
exercise discretion in a fair, well-reasoned fashion and to furnish a
record that will demonstrate the same.6 3 In fact, affording due def-
erence to agency expertise while providing an opportunity for judi-
cial oversight of an agency decision is the foundation upon which
61. E.g., McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
62. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252-1254, 1257-1258 (1976) (Supreme Court appellate jurisdic-
tion); 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) (Courts of Appeals appellate jurisdiction).
63. See generally K. DAvIS, ADMisTRAIVE LAW § 16, at 12 (Supp. 1970); K. DA-
vis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
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administrative law rests.64
As was aptly said in the context of search and seizure law, judi-
cial oversight "should be viewed with an appreciation that to ex-
clude any particular ... activity -from coverage is essentially to
exclude it from judicial control and from the command of reasona-
bleness, whereas to include it is to do no more than say that it
must be conducted in a reasonable manner."65 Surely the minimal
standard to which we should hold those who operate our correc-
tional facilities is that minimal standard to which we hold trial
courts and virtually all other agencies-that they operate reason-
ably. As members of the society that placed prisoners under their
control, we have an obligation to assure reasonable and fair treat-
ment and, through judicial review, we can make great strides to-
ward living up to that obligation. It is difficult to believe that
anyone, whether legislature or court, would gainsay a prisoner's
opportunity to avail himself of court review.
I am not arguing here for an elimination of administrative dis-
cretion in correctional authorities. I recognize that administrators
must be vested with a good deal of discretion to allow them prop-
erly to discharge their responsibilities. Correctional authorities
have more expertise than the courts with respect to the manage-
ment, external safety, and internal security needs of a prison. Def-
erence to that expertise is appropriate: deference to agency
expertise is, after all, an important underpinning of administrative
law. But appellate review has never meant that the appellate tri-
bunal substitutes its judgment for that of the original decision-
maker. This is particularly true for review under the APA where a
court may overturn an agency decision only if that decision is un-
constitutional, is outside the boundaries of agency statutory or
procedural authority, demonstrates an error of law, is unsupported
by substantial evidence, or is arbitrary or capricious.66 Under the
APA, therefore, heavy deference is paid to the initial agency deter-
mination.67 Nonetheless, the opportunity is available, on this nar-
64. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 179-81 (1967);
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, CORRECTIONS 555, Standard 16.2 (1973). See generally Y. DAVIS, DIs-
CRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
65. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 393
(1974).
66. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917(6) (Reissue 1976).
67. Deference is given not merely because the trier of fact has the opportunity to
see and hear witnesses firsthand (and thus is in a better position to judge
credibility than is the reader of a cold record) but because agency expertise
is afforded great weight.
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row standard of review, to right any wrongs that advertently or
inadvertently occur.
Deference to agency expertise, however, is not equivalent to an
abdication of all responsibility to oversee agency decision-making.
While an agency is closest to the needs and problems associated
with its efficient functioning, that same closeness may on occasion
make the agency decision-maker oversensitive to agency needs
and problems in an attempt to make it easier to run an efficient
operation. In the correctional setting this oversensitivity may be
complicated by a tendency on the part of a prison hearing board to
keep correctional staff satisfied if a decision adverse to its position
at a disciplinary hearing may be interpreted by staff as a lack of
confidence or support.6 8 An objective review body can assure that
a proper balance is maintained.
The need for an objective review is a particular necessity when
the agency involved is a department of corrections. Violence in
prisons is not an unusual circumstance. Every year in this country
we are faced with prison riots and other disturbances occurring
within prison walls. In a controlled setting, with little or no outlet
to relieve pressure, what would be minor problems on the outside
take on entirely new dimensions. The prisoner has nowhere else
to go and no real ability to make his voice heard. He must deal
with the people with whom he is placed-often frequently.
Admittedly, although not the situation with Reed,69 many pris-
oner grievances are unimportant, even petty, in any objective com-
parative view of the nature and seriousness of various types of
deprivations. Yet these grievances, if subject to court review,
would still take up valuable, and generally limited, court time. The
context out of which prisoner claims arise, however, must be
remembered in evaluating the seriousness of these claims and the
concomitant need to take up valuable court time for court review.
As Chief Justice Burger cogently observed, the loss of even a few
packs of cigarettes can be a major deprivation for a prisoner since
68. Oversensitivity to prison needs is accentuated when, as is the case with Ne-
braska prison disciplinary hearings, there is no requirement that the hearing
officer be independent of the Department of Correctional Services. See NEB.
REV. STAT. § 83-4,122(1) (Reissue 1976) (disciplinary boards to be appointed
by the director of corrections who shall try to include on these boards a rep-
resentative from the treatment or counseling staff).
69. Reed lost all accumulated good time as a result of the disciplinary hearing
concerning his escape. An award of good time decreases the amount of time
to be served; forfeiture of good time, then, effectively increases the prison
term. In theory, since the prisoner is subject to serving the entire sentence
imposed, forfeiture of good time is not viewed as increasing the sentence.
Whether or not the loss of good time technically increases the time to be
served, it may not be described as of little consequence to a prisoner.
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a prisoner most likely has limited funds from which to make
purchases and limited access to sources of supply.70 Because of
the circumstances in which a prisoner finds himself, unresolved
grievances that free citizens would denominate as petty frequently
are not so perceived by a prisoner. What begins as a minor dispute
involving one or a few prisoners can quickly accelerate into a much
larger problem for the prisoner-and often for the prison and the
outside society as well.
Until the 1960's the judiciary had a "hands-off" policy with re-
spect to the consideration of prisoner legal claims outside the
scope of habeas corpus. 71 Not surprisingly, the insulation result-
ing from this hands-off policy contributed to an unfortunate his-
tory of prisoner exploitation in American prisons.7 2
Happily, in recent years courts have been passing through the
closed prison doors to assure the legality of what transpires
there.73 Correctional practices are being evaluated by courts in
the light of legal and constitutional principles. In part, this reflects
a natural and reasonable, if latecoming, decision to hold prison ad-
ministrators to the same standard required of other governmental
decision-makers. In part, however, the demise of the hands-off
doctrine probably reflects an appreciation that the need for judicial
review of official decision-making is even more striking in the vola-
tile prison context than elsewhere.
It has been repeatedly well noted by courts and commentators
that prison violence and related disturbances will continue to
erupt unless effective ways are developed to diffuse tension and
handle complaints.74 Availability of court review, and the sense of
70. Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch-1973, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1128
(1973). See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT- CORRECTIONS 83 (1967). See generally
N. MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG (1979); THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE
NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA, ATTICA (1972).
71. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321-22 (1972); Champagne & Haas, The
Impact of Johnson v. Avery on Prison Administration, 43 TENN. L. REV. 275,
275 (1976); Turner, Establishing The Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for
Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473, 503-04 (1971).
72. See, e.g., ABA JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS (Tent. Draft 1977), re-
printed in 14 Am. CRIm. L. REV. 377, 460 (1977); C. RuSCHE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER,
PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 42, 65 (1939); Special Project, The Collat-
eral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 947 (1970).
73. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817
(1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319
(1972); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). See generally Champagne &
Haas, supra note 71; Turner, supra note 71.
74. See, e.g., Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S.
920 (1967); R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 515-16 (1973); THE
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA,
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fair treatment that court review imparts, is one way to diffuse ten-
sions. This would seem to be a significant policy reason in support
of judicial review.
Another policy reason for providing judicial review in Nebraska
on the narrow grounds of the state's APA is to preserve the state's
voice in representing its interest in the fair and efficient operation
of its prison system. Prisoners in many of the cases that would be
heard under APA judicial review will also have a potential right of
access to the federal courts through federal habeas corpus 75 or sec-
tion 1983 actions. 76
Federal habeas corpus is available to test prison decisions af-
fecting the duration of a prisoner's sentence (such as the loss of
good time) while section 1983 actions are available to raise claims
with respect to the conditions of confinement. 77 Each year more of
these cases are heard in the federal courts.7 8 Today it is "almost
supra note 70, ch. 2; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS, supra note 64, at 57. Thus, prisons have developed
formalized grievance procedures and other processes, both formal and infor-
mal (including oversight by an ombudsman), to assure prisoners the oppor-
tunity to be heard. Decisions substantially affecting the lives of prisoners
result in hearings at which minimal due process rights attach. Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480 (1980); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Procunier v. Marti-
nez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974). But cf. Meacham v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976)
(lack of hearing prior to transfer of prisoners from one institution to another
does not violate the due process clause where state law does not create ex-
pectancy of hearing).
75. The statutory grant of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction for federal prisoners
is 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976); for state prisoners it is 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). A
procedural alternative to habeas corpus, a motion to vacate the sentence, 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1976), was provided to federal prisoners in 1948. This proce-
dure must be used in lieu of the writ of habeas corpus unless it is "inade-
quate or ineffective." Id. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 378 n.10 (1977).
76. The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
77. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). The appropriate habeas corpus
remedy is release from an unconstitutional incarceration. Id. at 484. Chal-
lenges to the conditions of confinement, for which the prisoner may seek
damages, are § 1983 claims. Id. at 489. The line of demarcation is not com-
pletely clear, however. A prisoner who may not seek restoration of good time
credits in a § 1983 action (since this affects sentence duration) may nonethe-
less seek a declaratory judgment concerning the legality of the procedure
under which good time was lost. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554-55
(1974). Perhaps a more significant difference between § 1983 and federal
habeas corpus petitions is that presentation of a claim on federal habeas
corpus requires exhaustion of remedies. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944); Reid v. Jones, 187 U.S. 153 (1902);
New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89 (1894); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). Sec-
tion 1983 actions do not require exhaustion. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
78. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 50 (2d ed. 1973) & 233-34
(Supp. 1981).
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customary in this country for social reform to find its way into the
federal courts and for the reaction against that reform to take
shape in diatribes against the intervention of federal courts.
Prison reform is simply another example of this phenomenon."7 9
If the state legislature and courts want a voice in assuring that
proper weight is given to the state's interests in disputes between
prison and prisoner, then the most efficacious way of doing this is
to provide review, in a state court, of the prison administrative
action.
State court review will not, of course, foreclose the prisoner's
access to federal court on a federal claim in the event that the state
court decision does not satisfy him. But the state court decision,
particularly in light of any findings of fact the state court may
make, may have an estoppel effect on the subsequent federal court
proceedings. In the context of a state fourth amendment suppres-
sion hearing, for example, the United States Supreme Court re-
cently held that state court findings on the question of the
constitutionality of the search may be conclusive on a federal court
faced with a section 1983 damages action against the state law en-
forcement officers who conducted the search.8 0 In reaching its de-
cision, the Court found an absence of congressional intent in
section 1983 to restrict or avoid traditional estoppel doctrine as
well as an absence of any "generally framed principle that every
person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered
opportunity to litigate the right in a federal district court."81 Thus,
in Reed, the Nebraska Supreme Court, by declining to permit judi-
cial review under the APA, in effect may have placed in the federal
courts the first and only opportunity for review of a state correc-
tional decision governing treatment of prisoners in a state
institution.
This is a most unfortunate policy result. A state should at least
attempt to resolve its own problems. A state system of judicial re-
view should preclude federal court involvement in state issues af-
fecting federal rights except as a last resort and then only in
situations in which the state has failed to protect those rights. The
legislature would probably agree that the preferred state policy is
one in which a state rather than a federal court reviews the deci-
sion-making process of a state correctional facility.
One arguably advantageous effect of the Reed decision is that in
turning away these prison cases the state courts might experience
an alleviation, or at least not an increase, in any docket manage-
79. McCormack, The Expansion of Federal Question Jurisdiction and the Pris-
oner Complaint Caseload, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 523, 523.
80. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
81. Id. at 103.
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ment difficulties. 82 But this is an advantage paid for at the cost of
avoiding a legal responsibility of review in an area where the state
interest is great and where state control over the operation of its
prisons would seem to be advisable if not necessary.83 It is an ad-
vantage paid for not by avoiding the intrusion in prison adminis-
tration that the court finds implied in judicial review but merely by
transferring that reviewing obligation to federal courts. Review by
these courts, perhaps less sensitive than state courts to state insti-
tutional needs, may render the intrusion more apparent, and more
drastic. 84
V. APA PRISONER APPEALS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
In its discussion of prisoner appeals under the Nebraska APA,
the Reed majority offered one other ground for its refusal to hold
the judicial review sections of the APA applicable to prison hear-
ings: it was unable to find even one court that had held its jurisdic-
tion's general APA applicable to its prisons. 85 The absence of
supporting precedent in this area, even if true,86 must be treated
with caution. First, as the court correctly noted,87 there are few
cases dealing with the applicability of administrative procedure
acts to prisons. In fact, the court was able to discover only one
case, Lesser v. Humphrey,88 holding an APA inapplicable to prison
hearings. One case, particularly one decided over thirty years ago
82. Whether the state court docket will be lighter because prisoner cases will not
be heard depends in part on what the court in Reed meant by its allusion to
the possibility of hearing claims like Reed's under the Nebraska Declaratory
Judgment Act. 207 Neb. at 799-800, 301 N.W.2d at 345-46. For a discussion of
this aspect of Reed, see text accompanying notes 114-29 infra.
83. E.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973):
It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger
interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, reg-
ulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons ....
[Prison litigation] is most efficiently and properly handled by the
state administrative bodies and state courts, which are, for the most
part, familiar with the grievances of state prisoners and in a better
physical and practical position to deal with those grievances.
84. I am not suggesting bias on the part of either the state or federal courts but
merely a potential difference in emphasis permissible, indeed unavoidable, in
a factfinder. A nonunanimous jury verdict is a good example of this phenom-
enon. Each factfinder brings his own particular perspective, based on train-
ing, background, and predilection, to his factfinding task. In the context of a
prison case, there may be a difference based on the state court's closer rela-
tion to state problems and interests. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
491-92 (1973).
85. The court evidently was unwilling to start a trend itself.
86. This finding by the court is incorrect. For a discussion of relevant precedent
in this area, see text accompanying notes 99-110 infra.
87. 207 Neb. at 799, 301 N.W.2d at 345.
88. 89 F. Supp. 474 (M.D. Pa. 1950).
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at a time when administrative law was not as widely accepted and
as generously treated as it is today,89 is hardly overwhelming sup-
port for the Reed decision. The best that can be said of the caselaw
as the court found it is that it left an open field in which the court
could plow.
A second, and more telling, criticism is that the task before the
court in Reed, and the federal district court in Lesser, was a matter
of statutory construction. As Chief Justice Krivosha correctly
pointed out,90 the Nebraska Supreme Court in Reed had to view
the Nebraska APA and decide what that statute required with re-
spect to prisoner appeals. If the plain language of the Nebraska
APA required judicial review,9 1 then such review could not be
avoided by finding that no other legislature had enacted similar
legislation. Nevertheless, the Nebraska court, experiencing diffi-
culty interpreting statutory language and intent, might well turn to
court decisions in other jurisdictions and be persuaded by the pol-
icy considerations employed by those courts in interpreting statu-
tory language similar to that of the Nebraska APA. But the key to
the persuasive quality of such other decisions is the similarity of
the statutory language at issue in each case. Any reliance on
Lesser proves ill-advised for precisely this reason. At the time
Lesser was decided a federal prisoner had no statutory right to an
agency hearing prior to the forfeiture of good time.92 The absence
of this statutory right was crucial to a determination in Lesser of
APA inapplicability to prisoner appeals because the APA there
under review applied only to cases "required by statute to be de-
termined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."93
This language, according to the Lesser court,94 did not include
"those hearings which administrative agencies may hold by regu-
lation, rule, custom, or special dispensation."95 Since it was
89. At the time Lesser v. Humphrey was decided, for example, Nebraska's APA
had been in effect only a few years and had been, and still is, undergoing
substantial legislative change. See Wllborn, supra note 5, at 1-3 & n.3. For a
discussion of the expansion of administrative law, see generally Environmen-
tal Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971); L JAFFE & N.
NATHANSEN, ADnimisPTIvE LAw, CASES AND MATER ALS (4th ed. 1976).
90. 207 Neb. at 801, 301 N.W.2d at 346 (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting).
91. The Chief Justice believes, as do I, that the APA does require judicial review.
Id.
92. 89 F. Supp. at 476. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161-4166 (1952) (current version at 18
U.S.C. §§ 4161-4166 (1976)).
93. 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1946) (Adjudications) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 554
(1976)).
94. The Lesser court's interpretation of the APA language was based on the deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33, 48 (1950).
95. 89 F. Supp. at 476.
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through a prison rule, as "a matter of grace," 96 that Lesser was af-
forded his hearing, he was not entitled to judicial review under the
APA under consideration by the Lesser court.
Today, a prisoner facing forfeiture of good time at a prison disci-
plinary hearing is entitled, as a matter of constitutional due pro-
cess, to a hearing at which he may present witnesses and
evidence. 97 Consequently, the disciplinary action against Lesser
perhaps would be reviewable today even under the specific APA
language before the Lesser court.98
Lesser, therefore, offers no support for the Reed decision. It is
thirty years old, and derives from an administrative concept and
statutory and constitutional context no longer relevant to the pre-
cise issue before the Nebraska Supreme Court in Reed. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court found no other decisions in which APA
applicability to prison hearings was considered. Michigan is one
jurisdiction, however, that evaluated statutory language substan-
tially similar to the Nebraska APA and held the judicial review
provisions applicable to prison hearings.
In the prison context the Michigan courts three times 99 inter-
preted the language in the Michigan APA calling for "judical re-
96. Id.
97. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
98. A reviewing court would have to determine that the statutory language "re-
quired by statute to be determined on the record" either (1) was meant to
include hearings found constitutionally to be required by the United States
Supreme Court, or (2) after Wolff, should be interpreted to include such con-
stitutionally required hearings. This statutory construction is not
inconceivable.
99. Parshay v. Buchkoe, 30 Mich. App. 556, 186 N.W.2d 859 (1971); Penn v. Depart-
ment of Corrections, 100 Mich. App. 532, 298 N.W.2d 756 (1980).
In Parshay the prisoner, claiming infringement of his first amendment
rights in speech and mail, sought to be heard through a complaint for manda-
mus. The court held that mandamus was inapplicable since the warden's ac-
tions involved an exercise of discretion. The court added that the prisoner
could "test the validity or proper legal applicability of the rules and orders of
the defendant as applied to him. Such action is provided by statute by the
declaratory judgment as set forth in the Michigan Administrative Procedures
Act." 30 Mich. App. at 559, 186 N.W.2d at 861. The action in Parshay had to be
heard as a declaratory judgment under the APA because, unlike Reed, the
prisoner had not sought a prison hearing and final determination by the war-
den before seeking judicial relief.
In Penn the plaintiff a parolee, sought review under the Michigan APA of
the parole board decision revoking his parole. The court reaffirmed that it
was "beyond question that the department of corrections is an 'agency' for
purposes of the APA." 100 Mich. App. at 536, 298 N.W.2d at 757. See text ac-
companying notes 101-03 infra for a discussion of the third case, Lawrence v.
Department of Corrections, 88 Mich. App. 167, 276 N.W.2d 554, appeal denied,
407 Mich. 909 (1979).
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view of a final decision or order in a contested case"100 before an
agency. Lawrence v. Department of Corrections'0 ' is the decision
most directly on point to the facts in Reed. Lawrence sought re-
view of a prison disciplinary decision resulting, among other
things, in five days detention and reclassification to a higher secur-
ity classification. The Lawrence court squarely held that a prison
disciplinary hearing was a "contested case"10 2 under the Michigan
APA:
The definition of a "contested case" is clear and unambiguous. The
statutory provision in which we find it requires neither construction nor
interpretation. Application of the plain language of the statute leads unal-
terably to the conclusion that a prison disciplinary hearing fits squarely
within the terms of the definition. Such a hearing is certainly a proceed-
ing in which the Department of Corrections is required to make a determi-
nation as to an inmate's legal rights, duties or privileges and there is no
question that due process requires that the inmate be given an opportu-
nity for an evidentiary hearing.
1 0 3
The court held that since a prison disciplinary hearing is a con-
tested case under the Michigan APA, Lawrence was entitled to ju-
dicial review of the disciplinary board decision.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia evaluated
substantially similar language in the federal APA1O4 and similarly
found APA judicial review applicable to prison hearings. Unlike
Michigan, there is no single, clear decision on point. But when
read together, two cases, Pickus v. Board of Parole 105 and Ramer v.
Saxbe, 0 6 seem clearly to point to APA applicability. Pickus held
the federal APA applicable to the Board of Parole and found that
APA judicial review obtained. 07 Ramer held the APA applicable
100. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 3.560(202) (1970).
101. 88 Mich. App. 167, 276 N.W.2d 554, appeal denied, 407 Mich. 909 (1979). Law-
rence was found guilty of marijuana possession.
102. The Michigan statutory definition of "contested case" is: "A proceeding, in-
cluding rate-making, price-fixing, and licensing, in which a determination of
the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a named party is required by law to be
made by an agency after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing." MicH.
STAT. ANN. § 3.560(103) (Supp. 1981).
By comparison, the Nebraska APA definition of a contested case is: "A
proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of
specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined
after an agency hearing." NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-901(3) (Supp. 1981).
103. 88 Mich. App. at 171, 276 N.W.2d at 556.
104. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). This section provides that "a person ... adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by agency action ... is entitled to judicial review
thereof." Id.
105. 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
106. 522 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
107. The Pickus court found the APA judicial review provision applicable in a pro-
cedural setting in which the prisoner did not ask specifically for relief clearly
1982]
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to prison rulemaking0 8 and, in a footnote discussion, described the
meaning and scope of the Pickus decision as
deciding in effect that the Bureau of Prisons is an "agency" for the pur-
poses of the APA; that its so-called "policies" or "guidelines" generally
controlling the activities, conduct and discipline of persons under its cus-
tody or control could not be considered mere internal management poli-
cies, technical regulations, interpretive provisions or rules of agency
organization, practice or procedure, but are subject to the notice or publi-
cation requirements of APA; and that the district court had, and thus the
appellate court has, subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of§ 10 of APA, if
not otherwise.1 0 9
Thus, on substantially similar language, the Michigan and D.C.
circuit courts found, contra to the Nebraska Supreme Court in
Reed, that the APA judicial review sections apply to prison hear-
ings. The dissimilarity in result between those two courts and the
Nebraska court does not mean, of course, that they are correct and
Reed is not. But these other decisions demonstrate that despite
what the majority believed, the Krivosha dissent in Reed finds
support in other court decisions."0
Furthermore, even in the absence of an applicable APA, the
New Jersey Supreme Court was willing to find a right of prisoner
appeal, from a parole board denial of parole, through exercise of
that court's general, traditional, and constitutionally embodied
prerogative writ jurisdiction."' Jurisdiction to review was found
in the face of an arguably untimely petition for review.112 The rea-
sons given by the New Jersey court for its decision to intercede
were that judicial review was necessary to assure fairness and pre-
vent abuses of discretion in the parole board's performance of its
discretionary duties." 3 Had the Nebraska Supreme Court af-
forded similar weight to the interests of fairness and prevention of
arbitrary decision-making, the Krivosha dissent might have be-
come the majority opinion. And properly so.
within the auspices of APA judicial review. 507 F.2d at 1109-10. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 703 (1976).
108. The court noted that prison rules "affect and control daily activities, rights
and disabilities in a special setting." 522 F.2d at 701.
109. Id. at 700-01 n.6 (emphasis added). Section 10 of the federal APA is the sec-
tion granting entitlement to judicial review. See Pickus v. Board of Parole,
507 F.2d 1107, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
110. It is also true, at least as far as I was able to determine, that in neither Michi-
gan nor the federal system is there a specific statute dealing with prison dis-
ciplinary hearings whose scope and meaning required harmonizing with the
APA.
111. Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 248-49, 277 A.2d 193, 198-99
(1971). The arbitrariness claimed by Monks was the Board's refusal to pro-
vide him with a specific statement of reasons for his parole denial.
112. See id. at 242, 277 A.2d at 195. The court decided the merits without ever
reaching the timeliness objection. Id.
113. Id. See generally K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
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VI. AFTER REED, WHAT DIRECTION REVIEW?
A. Declaratory Judgments
Reed v. Parratt, however wrongly decided, is now law in Ne-
braska. Absent legislative action, is there today any opportunity
for state court review of a prison disciplinary action, or does Reed
conclusively put beyond the reach of a Nebraska court prison hear-
ing decisions that affect significantly the duration and quality of
prison life? Certainly the primary policy consideration put forth
by the majority to justify its decision-the need for speedy and in-
formal resolution of prison hearings-should apply with equal
force to court review whatever the statutory or procedural author-
ity. In addition, if the majority correctly interpreted the legislative
language and underlying intent of the Nebraska statute governing
prison disciplinary hearings as precluding court review under the
APA, then the specific language of that statute equally should
override the opportunity for judicial review outside of the APA.
Nevertheless, the Reed majority did not clearly foreclose all oppor-
tunity for review. Instead, it made an oblique reference to the pos-
sible availability of "declaratory judgment relief."114
Declaratory relief in Nebraska is available through the Ne-
braska Declaratory Judgment Act.115 The majority opinion offers
no guidance as to why a declaratory judgment may be available to
petitioner Reed while APA judicial review is not. Although the De-
claratory Judgment Act does not in terms require exhaustion of
remedies, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that:
Proceedings for a declaratory judgment will not be entertained where an-
other equally serviceable remedy has been provided by law, or where the
resultant issue can be as well and speedily determined in ordinary pro-
ceedings open to the parties or is within the exclusive original jurisdiction
114. 207 Neb. at 799, 301 N.W.2d at 345. The court remanded to the district court for
a determination of the applicability of declaratory relief. Whether a declara-
tory action is available, it appears that there is no other statutorily prescribed
means of review. The Nebraska Post Conviction Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-
3001 to -3004 (Reissue 1979), for example, applies only to constitutional chal-
lenges to conviction and sentencing and not to legal challenges to what tran-
spires at the prison unrelated to the criminal trial. For a thorough discussion
and evaluation of the Act, see Hoffman, Trial Court Responses to Claimsfor
Relief Under the Nebraska Post Conviction Act: A Taxonomy, 58 NEB. L REV.
355 (1979).
115. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,149 to -21,164 (Reissue 1979). The Act was adopted in
1929. Declaratory Judgment Act, 1929 NEB. Laws 257. It is based on the NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
DECLARATORY JuDGMENTs ACT (1922), reprinted in 12 UNIFORM Laws ANN.
(1975). For an evaluation of relevant aspects of the Uniform Act, see
Borchard, The Uniform Act, 34 HARv. L REV. 697 (1921); Borchard, Discretion
to Refuse Jurisdiction ofActionsfor Declaratory Judgments, 26 MINN. L. REV.
677 (1942).
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of another tribunal or board.1 1 6
Nor will the court allow the Declaratory Judgment Act to substi-
tute for a new trial or appeal."17
The effect of Reed is to find inapplicable to prison hearings "an-
other equally serviceable remedy""6s and thus to open to prisoners
the possibility of declaratory relief that otherwise might be un-
available. Further, Reed may be seen as requiring that the same
prison disciplinary statute that is exclusive as to original jurisdic-
tion and acts as an absolute bar to APA judicial review may not be
exclusive or act as a bar with respect to declaratory relief.
The Reed court may have left open the possibility of declara-
tory relief because it interpreted "review"11 9 under the prison dis-
ciplinary statute as a word of art. A declaratory judgment action,
even one in which a final prison hearing decision is under consid-
eration, is an original action because it is a collateral attack. Thus,
technically, a declaratory judgment action is not a "review" of an
existing decision and may be outside the meaning of the prison
disciplinary statute. In addition, the court might have believed
that the statutory prison hearing procedures are not exclusive with
respect to declaratory judgments since the final statutory section
expressly reserves to a prisoner the right to "free access to the
courts... in any cause of action arising under [the statute]."120
This reading of the statute makes consistent the Reed holding
that APA judicial review is inapplicable to a prison hearing but de-
claratory relief possibly may not be. The statutory language can
thus be harmonized-but the price of this harmony is inconsis-
tency in terms of underlying policy. If court review is obtrusive,
even dangerous, to the orderly and efficient administration of a
prison (and therefore something that the legislature would want to
avoid), then it will prove so whether it comes about through APA
review or a declaratory judgment action.
There is, however, one rationale that would make this policy re-
sult consistent with the Reed holding. Perhaps the Reed majority
believed that review under the Declaratory Judgment Act would
116. Strawn v. County of Sarpy, 146 Neb. 783, 786-87,21 N.W.2d 597, 599 (1946) (em-
phasis added). See Scudder v. County of Buffalo, 170 Neb. 293, 102 N.W.2d 447
(1960); Phelps County v. City of Holdrege, 133 Neb. 139, 274 N.W. 483 (1937).
117. Phelps County v. City of Holdrege, 133 Neb. 139, 141, 274 N.W. 483, 484 (1937).
118. The Nebraska decisions with respect to exclusivity and exhaustion of reme-
dies, see cases cited in note 116 supra, may be read narrowly as referring to
remedies only and not encompassing any notion of the type of claim that may
be heard or the particular court with jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
119. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-4,115 (Reissue 1976). ("Any review of disciplinary action
imposed upon any person shall be pursuant to the provisions of [the prison
disciplinary procedures statute]"). Id.
120. Id. § 834123.
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be conducted on a standard even narrower than that available
under the APA. As the Reed court said, review under the Declara-
tory Judgment Act will "necessarily be limited in nature since
such an action is a collateral attack upon the decision of the disci-
plinary committee."121 The Reed majority otherwise is silent as to
the extent declaratory judgment review will permit a court to look
into the factfinding process.122
Certainly collateral attack normally provides a more limited re-
view of a decision than is available on direct appeal,123 in part be-
cause of the availability of direct appeal to present claims. After
Reed, however, no direct appeal is available to a prisoner challeng-
ing a prison board decision. The absence of an opportunity for di-
rect appeal may, and indeed, I think, should, make the collateral
attack review in this context broader than is generally available,
equivalent to that review to which the prisoner would have been
entitled under the APA. APA review, after all, is narrow enough,
permitting a reversal or modification of an agency decision only if
the decision is unconstitutional, illegal, outside agency authority
or jurisdiction, clearly arbitrary, or unsupported by substantial
competent evidence on the whole record on review.124
On the other hand, if the Nebraska court decides that declara-
tory relief, if available at all, requires a narrower standard than
APA review, it may mean that the court will not review a prison
hearing decision to assure that there was substantial, competent
evidence supporting the decision.125 That a court would not review
for substantial evidence is troubling, particularly in light of the
curtailed procedures and relaxed evidentiary rules that obtain at
prison hearings, hearings in which uncorroborated hearsay may be
the sole evidence presented.126 The substantial evidence test, as
compared to an arbitrary and capricious test, at least requires
more than a "mere modicum" of evidence supporting the
decision:127
The critical difference [between the two standards of review] ... is un-
121. 207 Neb. at 799, 301 N.W.2d at 345. The court's position is not quite so clear
since it also attributed the limited nature of review to the fact that the issues
at Reed's disciplinary hearing previously were litigated at the criminal trial.
122. The court similarly is silent as to the extent a declaratory action would be
available to contest the validity of a prison rule or the adequacy of estab-
lished prison procedures.
123. On the distinction between direct review and collateral attack, see RESTATE-
UENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 4-9 (Tent. Draft No. 6,1979). See Fauntleroy
v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
124. NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 84-917 (Reissue 1976).
125. The remaining APA grounds for reversal or modification seem compelling
and hardly of a nature to be avoided by a reviewing court.
126. See, e.g., Meyers & Rabiej, supra note 43.
127. Compare Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 (1979) with Consolidated
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derscored in the prisoner context by the comparative availability of writ-
ten records of the proceedings on review. Whereas complete transcripts
of hearings under the A.P.A. (in which the substantial evidence standard
of review is used) are furnished for the reviewing judge, only a brief writ-
ten statement containing the reasons for disciplinary actions and the evi-
dence relied on for that action is submitted by prison administrators for
review purposes [under an arbitrary and capricious standard]. 128
No matter how expansive the standard employed by a court in a
declaratory judgment action to review the prison board factflnding,
petitioner Reed will not be helped. The facts relating to his escape
had already been determined in the criminal trial by a jury finding
of guilty-and that on the heaviest proof burden possible, proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt.129 But Reed's case, one in which the dis-
ciplinary hearings concerned an infraction for which the prisoner
had been prosecuted at a criminal trial, is not by any means the
usual prison disciplinary case.
Thus, a difference in the scope of review that is irrelevant to
Reed may well prove determinative in other prison cases. I would,
therefore, like to see the court in effect reverse its decision in Reed
by providing an APA standard of review under the Declaratory
Judgment Act. Waiting for the court to act, however, is not the
only, nor even the best, way to avoid the Reed result.
B. Legislative Response
The best way to assure an APA standard of review to prisoner
challenges of prison disciplinary and other board decisions is for
the legislature to respond by statute to Reed. There are several
ways for the legislature to achieve a reversal of the Reed result by
clarifying for the court the legislative intent to provide to prisoners
judicial review under the APA. I would like to present two possi-
ble statutory solutions.
The first and easiest way to avoid the Reed result is to amend
the language in the Nebraska prison disciplinary procedures stat-
ute upon which the Reed decision was based. Section 83-4,123,
"Access to Courts and Legal Assistance Unrestricted," would be
amended as follows:130
Nothing in sections 834,109 to 83-4,123 shall be construed as to restrict
or impair an inmate's free access to the courts, and necessary legal assist-
Edison Co. v. N.LR.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) and McDonald v. Board of
Trustees, 375 F. Supp. 95, 103 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
128. Meyers & Rabiej, supra note 43, at 549.
129. State v. Reed, 205 Neb. 45, 48, 286 N.W.2d 111, 113 (1979). Additionally, this
jury finding would have been based on evidence admitted according to the
strictest evidentiary and constitutional standards.
130. Use of full capitals indicates new language added, use of italics indicates lan-
guage deleted.
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ance in any cause of action arising under sections 83-4,109 to 83-4,123, OR
JUDICIAL REVIEW AS DESCRIBED IN SECTIONS 84-917 to 84-919.131
The second way statutorily to assure judical review is to ad-
dress specifically the prison hearings giving rise to a right of judi-
cial review, and then to describe particularly the nature and scope
of the review to be provided. In the Model Sentencing and Correc-
tions Act, for example, judicial review is authorized for: (1) an ad-
verse classification decision, 32 (2) a major adverse disciplinary
decision,133 and (3) a decision excluding a visitor from the
prison.134 In these cases, the Model Act provides judicial review
tailored specifically for the prison context135 and designed to be
"relatively fast and inexpensive.'36
The virtue of a specific and detailed provision governing judicial
review of prison hearing decisions is that the legislature can ad-
dress statutorily the problems and needs peculiar to prisons as
agencies. If, for example, most prison hearings involve minor dep-
rivations*37 and mild sanctions and, in the legislative judgment,
would demand too much court time in relation to the significance
of the claims, then the legislature could follow the example of the
Model Act and exclude all but those disciplinary hearings involv-
ing serious deprivations.13 8 In the Model Act, moreover, the poten-
tial of serious deprivation as a punishment also triggers the right
to a more formal hearing at the prison.3 9 Thus, the ultimate deci-
sion as to whether a formal hearing and judicial review are to be
provided to a prisoner rests in the hands of the prison administra-
tion.140 The administration may avoid a formal hearing and judi-
cial review in a proceeding merely by excluding serious
deprivation as a possible punishment.141
131. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-917 to -919 (Reissue 1976) are the judicial review sec-
tions of the APA.
132. M.S.C. § 1-104, Comment. This does not include initial classification
decisions.
133. Id. § 4-508 & accompanying Comment.
134. Id. § 4-118 & accompanying Comment In this instance the right of judicial
review is that of both the visitor and prisoner. Id.
135. Id. § 1-103 & accompanying Comment. The Model Act also provides specific
provisions governing prison rulemaking.
136. Id. § 1-104, Comment.
137. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
138. In so doing the legislature must remember to evaluate "serious deprivations"
in light of the prison context. These were defined in the Model Act as, among
others, confinement of a prisoner to his own cell for more than 10 days or in
separate housing for more than 10 days, loss of privileges for more than 40
days, and loss of good time. M.S.CA. § 4-508.
139. Id. § 4-507(b).
140. Cf. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (sixth amendment right to lawyer at-
taches only if imprisonment is to be the punishment imposed).
141. Of course, this decision will be affected by the seriousness of the infraction.
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The Model Act judicial review provision, which would make ju-
dicial review applicable and thus also solve the Reed problem,
reads as follows:
§ 1-104. [Judicial Review of Contested Cases.]
(a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies avail-
able within the department and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a
proceeding for which judicial review is authorized is entitled to judicial
review under this section.
(b) Proceedings for review must be instituted by filing a [petition;
complaint] in the [District Court of - County] within [101 days after
notice of the final decision of the department. Copies of the [petition;
complaint] must be served upon the department.
(c) The filing of a [petition; complaint] does not itself stay enforce-
ment of the department's decision. The department may grant or, upon its
refusal to do so, the reviewing court may order a stay upon appropriate
terms.
(d) If a [petition; complaint] for review on its face reflects that it is
meritorious, the reviewing court shall order the department to transmit to
the reviewing court in the form maintained by the department a copy of
the entire record of the proceeding under review. By stipulation of all par-
ties to the review proceeding, the record may be shortened.
(e) The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and
confined to the record. In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure
before the department, not shown in the record, proof thereon may be
taken in the court.
(f) The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the depart-
ment as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may
affirm the decision of the department or remand the case for further pro-
ceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial
rights of the person have been prejudiced because the findings, infer-
ences, conclusions, or decisions of the department are:
(1) in violation of a constitutional, statutory, or administrative
provision;
(2) in excess of the authority of the department
(3) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substan-
tial evidence on the whole record; or
(4) arbitrary or capricious. 1 4 2
VII. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Reed went out of its way to
avoid the plain language of the Nebraska APA and find its judicial
review provisions inapplicable to prison disciplinary decisions.
The court also misevaluated the policy considerations underlying
judicial review-both with respect to the court's attempt to find
legislative intent and, more generally, with respect to the nature
Nonetheless, I believe it to be preferred by prison administrators to a general
provision granting judicial review since it leaves them the discretion to evalu-
ate a case and make a choice as to the level, of formality required.
142. I.S.C. § 1-104.
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and efficacy of judicial review. The APA provides an appropriate
standard of review, and prison decisions, of all agency decisions,
should not be set apart from court scrutiny. Until the legislature
acts, I hope that the court will correct its decision in Reed by ex-
pressly finding that the Declaratory Judgment Act is applicable to
prison hearings and by employing a standard of review equivalent
to that of the APA.
